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Abstract 
 
The aim of this work is to analyze the outstanding issues and opportunities for 
upgrading corporate governance in state-owned enterprises - (SOEs) through a 
comparative analysis of this type of enterprise in Serbia and Slovenia. This is a 
very remarkable group of companies that have a major role in the overall 
economic life of both countries. Increasing efficiency and effectiveness in their 
management can contribute to raising the overall level of competitiveness and 
meeting the economic criteria for the integration of some countries in the 
European Union. In this paper we will try to identify several areas and examples 
of good practice which lead to improved corporate governance, and thus the better 
performance of this type of enterprise. In a variety of areas in which the corporate 
governance may be improved, we focused our analysis on the three areas, as 
follows: policy of ownership, regulations in terms of increasing transparency and 
functioning of the boards of directors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Serbia expects to gain the candidate status for membership in the 
European Union (EU) by the end of the year 2011. On its way to the EU, apart 
from fulfilling the political and legal criteria, Serbia has to pay special attention to 
meeting the economic criteria. To remind you, the economic criterion consists 
mainly from the need to develop market economy, able to cope with pressures 
imposed by the competitors on the EU market. To achieve that it is especially 
important to increase the competitiveness of all businesses, regardless of their size 
(small and medium-sized companies vs. large companies) or the ownership 
structure (private, joint stock companies and state owned enterprises - SOEs). As 
one of the fundamental issues that will be discussed in this paper is whether the 
SOEs sector in Serbia is capable of such challenges.  
 
The main objective of this work is to analyze the unresolved issues and 
opportunities for upgrading corporate governance in SOEs, primarily through 
comparative analysis of this type of business enterprises in Serbia and Slovenia. 
  
The Republic of Slovenia has successfully completed the transition processes and 
is the first ex-Yugoslav republic which became a full member of the EU and the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). It is a country that had identical economic 
system as Serbia, with a specific form of ownership (public property), enterprise 
self management, market oriented and open to foreign competition (M. Simonetti, 
A. & M. Rojec Gregoric, 2004, pp. 224-243), making it significantly different 
from the other former socialist countries of the so-called Eastern Block. Although 
there were differences between the two former Yugoslav republics in the structure 
of the economy and the achieved level of development, they shared the common 
economic space and faced more or less similar problems. Positive experiences in 
the field of corporate governance in Slovenia can be of great importance in 
completing the restructuring of the SOEs sector in Serbia and increase its overall 
competitiveness.  
 
Improvement of corporate governance in SOEs is a significant challenge to many 
economies in the world. The countries which have already started reforms of 
corporate governance in this type of enterprise share the same experience which 
proves that it is an important, but also a complex undertaking. The main challenge 
is to find a balance between the responsibilities of the state to actively exercise its 
ownership functions, such as the appointment and election of board members, at 
the same time restraining from imposing excessive and improper political 
interference in the operation and management of the company. 
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Among a great number of corporate governance principles defined by the OECD 
(OECD, 2004), our analysis will focus mainly on the three principles: providing a 
basis for an effective regulatory framework of corporate governance especially in 
the domain of ownership policy, transparency of business operations and 
functioning and responsibilities of the board of directors. 
 
In this paper the two basic ideas, i.e. hypotheses will be analyzed, as follows:  
 
• Management of SOEs should be professionalized and depoliticized, as the 
examples of good practice show that the competent management is able to 
organize the successful operations of these companies, regardless of the 
legal framework and the nature of ownership. 
• Improvement of SOEs operations largely depends on the way in which 
operational and strategic (investment) decisions have been made in this 
type of the enterprise.  
 
During the development of this work we encountered many problems and burning 
issues. In the first place we can point out different approaches to defining this 
type of enterprise, and the different terms used. Common terms which could be 
found in different places and different sources are the following: State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), Public Enterprises (PEs) or Government Controlled 
Enterprises (GCEs). 
 
At the ICPE Expert Groups gathering dedicated to corporate governance practice 
in the SOEs, which took place at the beginning of September 2011 in Ljubljana, 
the following definition was given: “Any commercial, financial, industrial, 
agricultural or promotional undertaking – owned by public authority, either 
wholly or through majority share holding – which is engaged in the sale of goods 
and services and whose affairs are capable of being recorded in balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts. Such undertakings may have diverse legal and 
corporate forms, such as departmental undertakings, public corporations, 
statutory agencies, established by Acts of Parliament or Joint Stock Companies 
registered under the Company Law” (Basu, 2008,  pp.10).  
 
A special group of problems which is closely related to terminological 
discrepancies results from the availability of the data. We tried to combine several 
sources of data. The National Institutes of Statistics certainly are one of those 
sources, but heterogeneity of sources and methods also limits a unique approach. 
The data obtained by the Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development 
(OECD) can be used, but it does not cover all EU Member States. The same goes 
for the data of the World Bank. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) can 
also be used, but this concerns only the number of employees for each sector and 
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not for their sub-sections according to the NACE classification, thus giving only a 
broad overview. 
 
In this research we have discovered that these types of enterprises are not so open 
for co-operation. Apart from that, there is a relatively modest literature, especially 
regarding the operation of the SOEs nowadays.   
 
Besides the introduction and conclusion, this paper consists of five basic parts. 
First, a brief overview is presented of trends in the development of corporate 
governance in the SOEs sector in the world and the EU. The third part is devoted 
to analyzing the challenges of restructuring and upgrading corporate governance 
in SOEs in Slovenia and Serbia. In the fourth section the outstanding issues of 
corporate governance are analyzed in the SOE sector in Serbia. The fifth part is 
dedicated to the analysis of best practices to improve corporate governance, both 
at the country level and through examples of some SOEs. The last, but not the 
least, at the end of the paper the list of references and literature used in 
developing of this paper is stipulated.  
TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE (SOES) SECTOR 
SOEs still represent a significant share of gross domestic product, employment 
and market capitalization in many countries. Moreover, SOEs are often prevalent 
in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, transport and 
telecommunications, whose business is of great importance to broad segments of 
the population and other parts of business sector.  
 
The importance of this sector varies from country to country. In many countries 
SOEs represent an important source of government revenue (China: 7%, 
Thailand: 7%, Turkey: 6%) and regions such as North Africa (Algeria: 60%, 
Egypt: 12%, Morocco: 4%, Tunisia: 7%), the Middle East (Jordan: 14%, 
Lebanon: 17%, Syria: 24%) and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic: 2%, Hungary: 
3%, Poland: 4%, Slovakia: 5%, Slovenia: 3%). In terms of employment, SOEs 
employ 34.3% of the total workforce in Ghana, 25.1% in Gabon, 12.2% in Sri 
Lanka, 8.1% in India, 7.7% in Kenya and 7.4% in China (Basu 2008, Khan 2008).  
 
In recent years significant changes have been identified in the sphere of state-
owned business enterprises (SOEs). While many countries carried out the 
privatization process during the 1980s and 1990s by reducing government 
ownership of business entities (Becht, 2003, pp. 8), the early 21st century brought 
about the opposite trend, which became particularly evident after the outbreak and 
strengthening of the negative impact of the global economic crisis. In all these 
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processes the key issue still refers to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
management (Khan, 2008, pp. 6). Awareness is growing that changes are 
necessary in corporate governance. These changes are demonstrated in several 
areas, among which we point out the three - ownership policies, regulations 
related to increased transparency and disclosure standards and functioning of the 
board of directors. 
 
Within the changes in ownership policies, a greater “centralisation” of the 
ownership function has been noted. This tendency seems to reflect, first, a 
shrinking portfolio of SOEs and, secondly, a greater tendency to list SOEs on 
stock exchanges – both of which tend to make a coordinated ownership function 
more feasible and more useful. In addition, a long-term fiscal squeeze in many 
countries may have induced governments to rethink their ownership practices 
purely on efficiency grounds. Various solutions can generally be found. As for 
example, two countries have moved to a central ownership model, with the 
ownership henceforth the responsibility of a specialised unit (Finland) and the 
Ministry of Finance (New Zealand). Some countries have established a dual 
ownership model or strengthened the role of the Ministry of Finance in pre-
existent models (the Czech Republic; Switzerland). Finally, there are countries, 
like Hungary and Korea, which have established interministerial committees to 
obtain a better coordination of SOE ownership.  
 
Many EU countries in the period before the global crisis had a trend to reduce the 
number of SOEs, which was generally enforced through privatization. Thus, they 
solved the problems of inefficient management and reduction of state influence in 
the economy. On the other hand, certain income was made. For example, in the 
Netherlands some 50 SOEs were privatized in the period 1980-2005 and the state 
had revenue of about EUR 14 bill (Habets, 2011). 
 
After the year 2007 and the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis 
concerns have grown about the efficiency of the market and new solutions have 
been sought for the development of the SOEs sector. In the Netherlands, the 
government was particularly interested in protecting the public interest in the 
energy sector (GasUnie & TenneT - energy transportation), as well as some other 
participants (Holland Casino de Staatsloterij - gambling). The role of the Ministry 
of Finance have changed, and it has become an active shareholder thereby 
predominantly focusing its SOE ownership on 4 core issues - corporate strategy, 
investment policy, capital structure and executive’s remuneration policy. 
 
A good example of the changing attitude of the state towards the management in 
this type of company is Finland, where in 2008 legislation was changed through 
ratification of the new State Company Act. The main difference as to the 1991 
Law refers to provisions concerning decision-making powers and the legal norms 
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governing the arrangements made in respect of the State’s holdings in corporate 
entities. Duties relating to state ownership steering are carried out in the 
Ownership Steering Department within the Prime Minister’s Office. The 
department is responsible for state ownership steering in companies operating on 
market terms.  
 
Even the most developed EU countries have reviewed their attitudes towards the 
ownership of SOEs. For example in Germany there are not many SOEs and there 
is a specific legal form called the Federal Government Holdings. The Government 
can participate in the founding of a private-law enterprise or in an existing 
enterprise only if there is an important interest on the part of the federal 
government and the purpose intended by the federal government cannot be 
achieved better or more economically in any other way. Germany belongs to the 
group of countries such as the Czech Republic and Switzerland which have a dual 
model of holding administration. Sector ministries exercise ownership function: 
representing state in general assembly of shareholders; determining 
responsibilities influencing the strategic goals of Federal Government holdings. 
Determining strategic goals is part of ownership function the sector ministries 
execute, partly in coordination with the Ministry of Finance (Offer, 2011) 
 
Another important area where the major changes in corporate governance of 
SOEs take place are related to regulatory changes, particularly to achieve greater 
transparency and compliance with the disclosure standards. These are issues that 
are of particular importance for the Republic of Serbia because still there are 
many problems in this area. In recent years some countries, such as Switzerland 
and Turkey implemented the system of aggregate reporting. Germany has 
strengthened the accountability mechanisms around the annual reporting that they 
had in place. Many countries have changed rules for SOEs’ disclosure of material 
information. All the changes go in the direction of greater disclosure, but the 
subject areas concerned differ greatly across countries – from regular annual 
accounts (Turkey), to sustainability reporting (Sweden), to a continuous 
disclosure regime for the largest SOEs (New Zealand). In other words, 
governments are increasingly aware of a need to enhance transparency and 
accountability in order to enhance SOE efficiency and gain public support for 
their ownership practices. 
 
The third area of change in corporate governance is related to the functioning of 
SOE boards of directors. That is the area where there are several different aspects, 
starting from the appointment of the candidates, eliminating the influence of 
politics, to the question of rewards and responsibilities. Further in this paper, we 
will see that regarding this issue, the example of Serbia is particularly sensitive 
and is associated with testing our first hypothesis. Examples of several countries 
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and many successful companies suggest that if the management of SOEs is 
professionalized and depoliticized their efficiency and effectiveness are greatly 
increased, which leads to growth of competitiveness of the country at the 
international level. 
 
Generally, there are many examples which confirm the attitudes stipulated above. 
For example, in Malaysia there is a Government Linked Companies sector 
(GLCs), which employs about 5% of the national workforce (400,000 
employees). In 2004, GLC Transformation (GLCT) Programme was launched 
with the dual aims of enhancing economic performance and accelerating the 
country's social and economic developments. One of the five elements of the 
program was the upgrading the effectiveness of boards and reinforcing the 
corporate governance of GLCs. Also, as one of the goals which appeared was 
adopting best practices within GLCs (GLCT Programme, 2011). After several 
years of application of the program 20 largest companies in this group achieved 
very tangible results, some of which stand out with total shareholder return which 
grew by a compounded annual growth rate of 16% over the past seven years, 
outperforming Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) by 2.1% 
 
Many EU countries used the conditions of crisis to carry out changes in 
legislation and introduce some improvements in the system responsibilities of the 
boards of SOEs. Thus, the changes were made in the following countries:  
 
• The Government of the Czech Republic issued Principles for remuneration 
to management and board members of corporations with state shareholding 
above 33% Including SOEs and other state institutions established by Law 
or Ministry. The aim of the Principles is to prevent inappropriate 
remuneration practices and increase transparency. The Principles 
establishes standard structures of remuneration, as well as accountability 
mechanisms to ensure their implementation. 
• In Italy, the company bylaws of unlisted SOEs were modified to introduce 
respectability and professional requirements among the criteria for 
nominating board members. A limit was also introduced to the number of 
board positions (executive as well as non-executive) that any individual 
may hold at the same time.  
• In Sweden, the Government introduced new guidelines for terms of 
employment for senior executives in state-owned companies in April 2009 
replacing the previous guidelines which were adopted in July 2008. 
According to the guidelines, the remuneration of the CEO is the 
responsibility of the board as a whole. The board should also ensure that 
the remuneration of both the CEO and other senior executives remain 
within the guidelines decided upon by the annual general meeting. In case 
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of any deviation from the government’s guidelines, the board is expected to 
report on the special reasons with respect to any particular case. 
 
Even the countries which are not known for importance of this sector have made 
certain changes. For example, the United Kingdom was known as a country that 
had a very small number of SOEs. However, in 2003 the problem of the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance has been recognized and the decision 
was made to appoint members of the management team regardless of political 
influence. This decision was accompanied by the desire to find more quality 
people for managerial positions, which resulted in a significant increase in 
performance. This has helped in overcoming one of the problems which SOEs 
encountered in the United Kingdom, which is providing the necessary capital and 
adequate capitalization of SOEs. Since these companies are often associated with 
public finance there is always fast and proper recognition of their needs for 
capital, which contributed to making certain decisions in a slow manner. 
 
Apart from these three roles, some countries, such as Egypt, have the new 
governmental strategy for public sector enterprises, which does not emphasize 
their economic role first. They are seen as one in social-economic development, 
i.e. employment, capacity / capability of government to intervene to ensure social 
justice, etc. (Ashraf, 2011). It should be noted that there are several countries that 
have completed the privatization process but retained ownership of SOEs in order 
to achieve specific and significant goals that could not be achieved economically 
in some other way. On the other hand, there are countries that have recognized the 
need for significant involvement of various levels of government in the economy. 
They retain the larger share of SOEs in order to achieve social justice or higher 
level of employment. 
 
However, despite the significant differences in views on the role and governance 
models, crucial precondition for successful governance of the SOEs is clear 
setting of the objectives which government wants to achieve by using SOEs. 
Clearly defined objectives, together with introduction of corporate governance 
principles, could make SOEs either powerful tool for achieving different goals of 
economic policy or competitive players in the market game with private sector 
enterprises. 
CHALLENGES OF RESTRUCTURING AND IMPROVEMENT OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOES IN SLOVENIA AND SERBIA  
In order to examine the challenges of restructuring and upgrading corporate 
governance practices, Slovenia and Serbia have been chosen because both 
countries have certain common characteristics. Companies used to belong to a 
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single economic system, based on public ownership and a special management 
system - self-management. There is a relatively similar national culture in both 
countries, as well as many similarities in the elements of organizational culture. 
Transition was implemented in completely different ways. Slovenia successfully 
completed transition during the 1990s, has met all requirements and became a full 
member of EU and EMU. Serbia significantly lags behind; it is faced with great 
challenges not only of European integration, but also structural problems in the 
economy. 
 
Nonetheless, current business problems which companies in Serbia and Slovenia 
encounter are quite different, as illustrated by the data provided by Enterprise 
Surveys conducted by the World Bank, as follows:  
 
Graph 1. Top 10 Business environmental Constraints for Firms 
 
 
 
However, we believe that benchmarking with Slovenian experience can help in 
seeking possible solutions to many problems and challenges which SOEs in 
Serbia encounter. In addition, some problems that Slovenia encountered fifteen 
years ago can still be found in Serbia. 
 
One of the important features of the restructuring, particularly of unprofitable 
enterprises in Slovenia, was to "install a system of corporate governance, with 
boards of (nonexecutive) directors responsible for monitoring the performance of 
management" (Simonetti, Rojec & Gregoric, 2004, pp. 227). In addition, activities 
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have been taken to reduce redundancies, providing the necessary liquidity and 
only after that they implemented privatization. In order to make a comparison, in 
Serbia the most profitable companies were rapidly privatized, and for those which 
had problems there were no clear vision and strategy of restructuring. 
Unfortunately, many of these companies belong to the group of SOEs. 
 
Defining the enterprise in which the Republic of Slovenia has the property is 
determined according to whether they are directly state-owned (fully or partially), 
indirectly (through the Pension Fund - Kapilaska Druzba – KAD or the 
Restitution Fund – Slovenska odškodninska druzba - SOD) or through a 
combination of the previous two methods. By the end of the year 2010 there were 
50 companies in Slovenia in which the state had direct ownership, of which in 19 
of them it was a sole owner. The number of companies where the state is an 
indirect owner totals 96, of which 20 of them with 100% ownership. Considering 
that in the Republic of Slovenia currently operates more than 110 000 companies, 
the participation of this sector with 146 companies is not huge by the total 
number. However, their total contribution to the creation of gross value added is 
moving at about 16-17% (OECD Economic Surveys: Slovenia 2011). 
 
KAD is a quasi-governmental fund and its main function is to manage pension 
schemes for civil servants in Slovenia. In addition, it offers additional and 
compulsory pension insurance in the private sector. However, during the 
privatization KAD became a "co-owner“of over 1,200 companies. During the 
time, the strategy has changed, so that KAD reduced its portfolio from over 1,000 
enterprises which it had after the first wave of privatization to only 80 by the end 
of 2009. The scope of work does not allow us to enter into a deeper analysis of 
the privatization process in Slovenia. From the concept of mass privatization in 
the late 1990s the process went towards increasing concentration of ownership. 
The strategy of the state was to retain ownership in large enterprises of strategic 
importance for the Slovenian economy. 
 
Another important institution, SOD, was formed to provide restitution to previous 
owners of privatized firms. By comparison, in Serbia there were more laws on 
privatization and a number of the privatized companies has been given to the 
pension fund, but it was a passive shareholder. Restitution Law was enacted in the 
mid 2011, under the pressure by the EU to meet the requirements for obtaining 
the status of the candidate, so there is no institution similar to SOD. 
 
SOEs that are directly owned by the state in Slovenia are in the field of energy, 
ports, telecommunications, postal services and railways, banking and insurance. 
Many large companies quoted on the Slovenian Stock Exchange are effectively 
controlled by KAD and SOD, such as Petrol, Triglav insurance, Sava or Gorenje. 
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In addition, two other companies - Telekom Slovenia and New Credit Bank of 
Maribor are directly controlled by the state. In terms of economic activities, the 
situation is more or less similar with SOEs in Serbia, with the exception of the 
ports which were privatized in the early years of transition. The state sold its 
ownership share in the banking sector, where he remained a minority shareholder 
in several banks (Commercial Bank, Jubmes, Privredna Bank), as well as in 
insurance, where it remained present only in Dunav insurance company.  
 
Some of the outstanding issues and problems faced by SOEs in Slovenia could be 
summarized as follows (based on OECD Country Reports): 
 
• Dissatisfaction with relatively low revenues from privatization - Between 
2000 and 2007 the income from privatization in Slovenia amounted to less 
than 5% of GDP. This is significantly lower than in other countries in 
transition, such as Hungary (which also had a very comprehensive program 
of privatization in the 1990s and where the revenues were made in the 
amount of 7% of GDP, the Czech Republic - 9% and Slovakia  - 14% 
(OECD , 2009) 
• Low productivity and profitability – especially in the banking sector and 
utilities 
• Slow development of corporate governance 
• Lack of incentives to management to make more significant changes in the 
process of company restructuring – due to a much dispersed ownership 
structure which was made after the first wave of privatization (OECD 2002, 
OECD 2011). 
• Selection of the members of the board of directors – although they seem 
independent from the government, both funds, KAD and SOD, are not 
completely independent, and the members of the boards of directors are 
appointed under the influence of the governing political structures.  
 
For faster transformation and restructuring of SOEs Slovenian Government has 
decided to change the ways of managing these types of enterprises. Until 
September 2010 the management of SOEs directly owned by the state was the 
responsibility of line ministries, and then a new Agency was formed to manage 
capital investments, which represent property rights based on the Act regulating 
corporate governance of state capital investments. It is an autonomous and 
independent institution whose powers consist of the following: 
 
• Control of the total assets directly owned by the state, 
• Use of property rights which refer to all direct and indirect shares in 
property, including appointments of the members of the boards of directors 
• Collection of centralized information on assets owned by the state, 
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• Follow up, measuring and reporting on performance, 
• Development and application of the Code of corporate governance which 
will be applied in SOE. 
 
In this way the Government of the Republic of Slovenia is trying to eliminate 
certain perceived weaknesses in the management of state assets, and raise 
standards of corporate governance, which was an integral part of the program of 
reforms in order to access the OECD. The intention is to increase the protection of 
rights of minority shareholders, increase capacity of judicial and regulatory 
authorities for monitoring and acting in accordance with corporate laws, 
restructure the funds' portfolio, all with the aim to raise the competitiveness and 
efficiency of this sector of the economy. Through the Agency the government 
tried to define a new strategy for management of the state assets. The Agency is 
required to prepare a strategy for at least 3 years which must be approved by the 
Parliament. The Strategy itself is concretized through the annual plans which have 
to be approved each year by the government. 
 
Compared with what Slovenia has done so far to promote the principles of 
corporate governance in SOEs, Serbia considerably lags behind. In Serbia there is 
a decentralized or "sector ministry model" where state-owned enterprises are 
under the responsibility of relevant sector ministries. A specific ministry plays a 
co-ordinating role, in addition to the main role played by sector ministries. The 
co-ordinating Ministry organizes cooperation between the various ministries and 
is in charge of elaborating the overall ownership policy as well as specific 
guidelines. Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economy and Regional 
Development play an important role. A particular problem in Serbia is the fact 
that heads of some ministries are the representatives of certain political parties, 
which do not always have fully synchronized activities. Therefore, there are 
different interests and influences. Insufficient coordination between ministries and 
the pursuit of the greater influence in some companies creates the picture that 
there is no clear government policy. 
 
The public enterprise sector in Serbia encounters huge challenges which can be 
summarized as follows (Eric, Stosic, Redzepagic, 2011): 
 
• According to Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) which was 
enacted in the Republic of Serbia on 1 January 2009, all SOEs were 
supposed to be prepared for the application of the European competition 
rules by the end of 2011. It was expected that corporization of big public 
enterprises established by the Republic of Serbia would have been faster, 
but it did not happen.  Excuses that these are consequences of the negative 
effects of the global economic crisis do not seem quite convincing. 
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• In addition corporatization and creation of professional management, 
deeper organizational and structural changes are expected. 
• Increasing levels of competition, particularly in the areas of infrastructure, 
natural monopolies and public utilities. Public enterprises in infrastructure 
sectors that have the character of natural monopoly will not be privatized, 
such as rail infrastructure, power transmission, international gas and oil 
pipeline.  
• Many problems arise in SOE operations at the local level, due primarily to 
the technical and technological obsolescence, many of these companies 
being oversized, tendencies to irrational consumption with simultaneous 
existence of high debt, the loss and high budget dependency and inability to 
finance participation in large investments.  
OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
IN SOES IN SERBIA 
SOEs in Serbia exist on three levels - republic, republic public agencies and local. 
Taking into consideration their importance and role in the overall economic life, 
their business attracts the attention of the general public, but not sufficiently the 
attention of the researchers. According to the recent data there are currently 695 
SOEs in Serbia, which are referred to as public enterprises, which is 
methodologically not most correct (National Bank of Serbia). By the number 
SOEs represents 0.7% of economic entities, employing 166.337 workers (16.2% 
of total employment), has over 1 / 3 of the value of fixed assets, generate 10.1% 
of total revenue, 9.3% of profit and 9.9% of loss in the economy. Public 
enterprises in 2010 had EUR 2.2 bill. gross value added (16.7% GVA of the 
economy). In comparison to 2009 GVA of public enterprises decreased by 1.8% 
(growth in the economy by 3.3%) 
 
It is generally believed that the entire process of transition in Serbia lasts for a 
very long time. In the area of SOEs operation certain positive effects have been 
achieved, especially in the field of economic and financial consolidation, which is 
achieved through modernization of production and technological processes, 
rescheduling of debts, subsidies, grants, pricing policies, etc. There was a 
significant decrease in the share of loss of public enterprises in GDP (from 7.6% 
in 2001 to 1.0% in 2010) and a slight increase in the share of profit (from 0.1% to 
0.8%, respectively). A greater share of profit of loss of GDP was achieved in 
2006 and 2009. Also, there was a reduction in the number of employees for more 
than 57.000 employees (from 148.962 in 2001 to 91.580 in 2010) with severance 
payments from the budget and based on allocations form side businesses. In 
comparison to 2001 the number of employees was reduced by about 40%. In 
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2010, the total profits of this sector amounted to about EUR 170 mill, while there 
was a loss of 500 million, which gives a negative aggregate score of around EUR 
330 mill. (www.apr.gov.rs). 
 
The global economic crisis has further slowed the process of restructuring and 
transformation of SOEs, which is indicated by the EBRD indicators. 
 
Table 1. Transition indicators for Serbia according to EBRD 
 
Period Large scale privatisation 
Small scale 
privatisation 
Enterprise 
restructuring 
Price 
liberalisation 
Trade & 
Forex 
system 
2006 2.67 3.67 2.33 4.00 3.33 
2007 2.67 3.67 2.33 4.00 3.33 
2008 2.67 3.67 2.33 4.00 3.67 
2009 2.67 3.67 2.33 4.00 4.00 
2010 2.67 3.67 2.33 4.00 4.00 
- table continuation -  
  
Period Competition Policy 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation 
Securities 
markets & 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
Overall 
infrastructure 
reform 
Total 
Average 
2006 1.67 2.67 2.00 2.00 2.70 
2007 2.00 2.67 2.00 2.00 2.74 
2008 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.33 2.89 
2009 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.33 2.89 
2010 2.33 3.00 2.00 2.33 2.93 
 
According to the EBRD indicators, Serbia lags behind most countries in the 
region in terms of privatization of large systems, management and restructuring, 
capital markets, the implementation of competition policy and infrastructure 
reform. 
 
Compared with other countries in the region, according to EBRD estimates, 
Serbia does not take a particularly favourable position in regard to the 
implementation of transition reforms. Namely, Serbia was ranked in 2010 worse 
than Croatia (3.55), Slovenia (3.41), Albania (3.07) and Macedonia (3.26), and 
somewhat better in comparison with BH (2.82) and Montenegro (2.89) 
 
The issue of restructuring SOEs in Serbia is still very topical. The draft Strategy 
of restructuring public utility companies (PUC) it is claimed that it is "... prepared 
with the aim to transform PUC, which are the responsibility of local governments, 
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step by step into financially sustainable, market-oriented businesses that provide 
high quality services to its customers. Efficient provision of utility services is 
important for the economy and for the benefit of all citizens of Serbia (Strategy 
for restructuring of public utilities, 2009, pp. 3)." The strategy is aimed at helping 
state and local governments to implement reforms, which will improve the 
provision of utility services while reducing costs. PUC perform activities of 
general interest so it is not possible to transform PUC in the same way as other 
privatized companies. Complete privatization of PUC will not be possible, even in 
a mid-term plan. Therefore, the directions of reform are considered in order to 
make their organizational transformation and develop alternatives for private 
capital involvement in this sector. 
 
The key recommendations of the Strategy are as follows:  
 
• Reform of ownership and management structure of PUC – in terms of 
negotiating ownership rights to local self-government 
• Defining relationships between municipalities and PUC – which would 
mean eliminating political influence 
• Improving operational performance of PUC – where the state provides 
technical support, while the financial support depends on total business 
performance. 
• Introducing methodology for determining tariffs and business standards – 
which means change of prices and tariffs for the services provided by these 
companies. 
• Preparation of the PU sector for the integration into the EU. 
• Improving and increasing capital investments – which would mean 
establishing responsibilities of PUC for defining and implementing long-
term investment plans, which are transformed into annual business plans. 
• Enabling participation of private capital – attracting private capital through 
the concept of public-private partnership (PPP).  
 
The main problems SOEs encounter in Serbia are as follows (Eric, Stosic, 
Redzepagic, 2011): 
 
• Extremely high political influence –refers to appointment of the members 
of boards of directors and supervising boards, who are changed with the 
change of political power, often regardless of the results achieved. As a 
negative consequence of such practice, corporate governance is bad and 
business performance is weak. 
• Very low effectiveness and efficiency of management, which reflects on 
the quality of products and services of these companies. 
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• Bad financial results and accrued losses – e.g. Serbian Railways suffered 
loss in 2010 of about EUR 170 mill. Public Enterprise “Putevi” suffered 
loss of about 40 mill, several companies from the electric power system 
incurred loss of more than 30 mill, and so on. Only in 2010 losses in this 
sector amounted to about EUR 500 mill. They are socialized and finally 
paid by tax payers. 
• The losses are incurred and accumulated for years, hampering investments 
and development opportunities of this type of enterprise 
• The financial imbalance - public companies operate in the conditions of 
illiquidity (below-average and low qualitative liquidity ratios) and debt 
(9.3% of liabilities of the economy), which is partly due to insufficient 
capability of SOEs in the area of financial management.  
• Big possible sources of corruption – especially in the domain of public 
procurement. 
• Too many employees and inadequate qualification and age structure. 
• Limited use of Public-Private Partnership (PPP). 
 
Apart from the aforementioned, it should be pointed out that the achievement of 
the European standards in infrastructure activities requires significant 
investments, improving regulations and strengthening the independence of 
regulatory bodies. Taking into account the European standards in the energy 
sector (oil industry, electricity), major environmental problems are still present in 
Serbia whose settlement requires large financial resources. Apart from meeting 
the ecology standards, there is a problem of quality standards of products and 
services. SOEs face huge challenges in these fields, especially given the problems 
with losses and unfavourable financial structure. 
 
If we look at the stipulated problems in the three dimensions of corporate 
governance that we analyzed in this paper (ownership policies, transparency and 
board of directors), the following conclusions can be drawn:  
 
• Still there is no clear policy in relation to the issue of ownership in SOEs. 
On the one hand there are ideas to make privatization of many SOEs at 
national and local level in particular, while on the other, there is a lack of 
the real willingness to do that.   
• Very little effort has been done to increase transparency and public 
disclosure of data and maintenance of accounting in accordance with the 
International 
Accounting Standards. There is no awareness of the need for the state 
(central or local government) to transparently management its assets. 
• The need has been identified to implement changes in the system of the 
functioning of board of directors. However, in practice very little has been 
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done on professionalization of SOEs management in Serbia. SOEs remain 
an area of great political influence.  
EXAMPLES OF IMPROVEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
We have to remind that corporate governance is a part of a broader economic 
context in which firms operate, which includes, for example, legislation, 
macroeconomic policies and the competition in the market for goods and services 
and factors of production. The corporate governance framework largely depends 
on the regulatory and institutional environment. In addition, factors such as 
business ethics and common awareness on environmental issues and social 
interests of the communities in which companies operates can also have an impact 
on its reputation and long-term success.  
 
The examples of the successful corporate governance can be analyzed at two 
levels. The one is related to the effort of the state to provide the necessary 
framework and respect of certain principles. On the other hand there is a level of 
the business entities that behave in a certain way. The extent to which 
corporations observe basic principles of good corporate governance is an 
increasingly important factor for many strategic decisions, especially those 
referring to investments. Of particular importance is the relationship between 
corporate governance practices and the growing international character of 
investment. International flows of capital enable companies to have easier access 
to all international funding sources. Besides, the level of the development of 
corporate governance is taken as one of the key criteria as well as the level at 
which companies respect accepted principles. If countries want to fully use global 
capital markets and attract long term investors who will not soon look for exit 
strategy, development of corporate governance should be credible, well 
understood in other countries and should respect internationally recognized 
principles. Even if corporations do not rely primarily on foreign sources of 
capital, compliance with good corporate governance practices will help increase 
the confidence of domestic investors, reduce the cost of capital, support good 
functioning of financial market and ultimately lead to more stable sources of 
funding. 
 
The example of Slovenia as to when to start privatization of some SOEs is one of 
the first examples of good practice at national level.  Relatively soon after the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the process of corporatization was 
carried out in Slovenia, the principles of corporate governance were introduced, 
restructuring processes initiated and only after a certain period of time these 
companies were sold. It very often coincided with the growth of share prices on 
the market. In this way, efficiency and effectiveness of management was raised as 
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well as the level of competitiveness of many enterprises. In addition, higher 
income was made in the state budget and economic criteria were faster met for the 
integration into the EU.  
 
Unfortunately, in Serbia there was not enough wisdom and patience. During the 
1990s, privatization was very slow. The model of free distribution of shares to 
employees was used, which did not prove too effective. Following political 
changes in 2000, the method of sale was introduced, which proved to be 
somewhat effective, but there was no clear sales strategy. Sometimes it seemed 
that everything that could be sold was actually sold, without too much thinking or 
analysis of whether something can wait.  
 
As another example of good practice we emphasize the fact that in Slovenia the 
Agency was formed to manage capital investment which has a very broad 
intervention in decision making about state ownership. In that way, Slovenia 
joined the group of countries that started to question the attitude of the state 
towards the state assets. 
 
Contrary to this approach, in Serbia there is still a lot of wandering in terms of the 
relationship between the state and the state-owned assets. However, one of the 
most recent examples proves that there are some changes. Amendments to the 
Law on Public Property have created preconditions for the transfer of ownership 
of local SOEs to local governments. At the same time, municipalities will be 
eligible to transfer a part of the property or the whole property to the PUC, which 
serves to perform public utility services. Establishing clear property relations 
between the founders and local SOEs should enable easier implementation of the 
process of regionalization of services and simplify private sector participation in 
providing public utility services. In this way the participation of the private sector 
that was reduced to a "pilot approach" should become greater.  
 
In an effort to analyze good practice we will try to point out the efforts that are 
made in the Republic of Serbia in order to resolve some of the SOE problems and 
raise their efficiency and effectiveness. In terms of evaluation of the effects of 
restructuring activities undertaken in SOEs, we can conclude that the higher 
efficiency of the implementation of the restructuring process has been achieved in 
the following areas: 
 
• In many of the SOEs on the national level, the progress has been made by 
applying certain measures of organizational, financial and production 
restructuring (such as the separation of non-core activities, the settlement of 
old debts, the modernization of production and technological processes), 
which have improved the economic and financial performance. 
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• So far, the change of legal form was made (from public enterprise into 
Public Limited Company) in JAT Airways (2008) Nikola Tesla Airport 
(2010) and the Serbian Railways. 
• The number of employees has been reduced through the application of 
passive and recently active measures in employment policy, which 
provided for more favourable qualification structure of employees.  
• In some SOEs the process of corporization has started and their 
development performances have been improved 
• Liberalization of infrastructural activities has been completed by 
introducing competition in the manufacturing and distribution of electricity, 
telephony, transport of passengers and goods by rail, postal services, air 
transport and imports of oil. 
• Financial consolidation of some SOEs was carried out.  
 
Along with the restructuring of large state systems, additional steps were 
undertaken that mark the beginning of the restructuring and privatization of local 
SOEs in certain municipalities in Serbia. Unfortunately moves in this area in most 
municipalities in Serbia are still insufficient, and involve outdated business 
organization (often of conglomerate type), insufficient inter-municipal 
cooperation, the lack of investment planning, the need to settle losses out of local 
budget, the lack of modern information systems , and the lack of serious 
monitoring, etc. 
 
As another example of good practice example we can cite the SOEs that are 
owned by the City of Belgrade. These are two companies that are 100% owned by 
the city. These companies are “Javno osvetljenje” (Public Lightening) and 
“Elektroizgradnja”. The management of both companies decided in early 2011 to 
initiate the creation of the Development strategy. Detailed due diligence was 
conducted which indicated that both companies do not have major problems in 
business and that they are managed economically. Although they have limited 
prices at which they charge their services, as defined by the decision of the 
founder - the City of Belgrade - both companies are profitable, without any long-
term liabilities. The example of these two companies confirmed that a quality 
management when professional and depoliticized is able to successfully organize 
business operations of these companies, regardless of the legal framework and the 
nature of ownership.  
 
However, the appointment of the boards in Serbia (selection of representatives of 
the state, directors at SOEs, etc.) remains an outstanding issue, and the examples 
of good practice in this area are not so numerous. One idea that could possibly be 
seriously considered would be the inclusion of employees in the board of 
directors or supervisory board. There are many such examples in the EU, 
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especially in Germany and France. For example, the experience of France - SOEs 
still have large boards compared with other OECD countries, but since 2005 the 
normal size has come down from 30 to 18. The composition of the boards remains 
the same - one third of the employee representatives, one third of the state 
representatives and one third of independent directors. 
 
In order to discuss this idea we need to consider that on that occasion in Slovenia 
the problem of "employeeism" was identified and referred to as "the tendency for 
woker-owners to use their decision-making power to influence decisions in the 
direction of excessive wages and employment" (Simonetti, Rojec & Gregoric, 
2004, pp. 227.), which was an obstacle to even more active restructuring of 
companies. Studies of individual authors in Slovenia have shown that employee 
participation in management has weakened managerial power in the 
implementation of strategic plans and accepting the necessary steps to increase 
competitiveness at the international level (Prašnikar & Gregoric, 2002). Given 
the high degree of similarity between the economies of Slovenia and Serbia 
fifteen years ago we are not sure that this idea would be cost-effective.  
 
One of the ideas for good practice can be related to selection and selection of 
managers who would manage SOEs. In Slovenia, professional managers are often 
selected, who are not entirely immune from politics. An example of Serbia, 
unfortunately shows that the professionalization of management is still more the 
exception than the rule. There are plenty of examples in the world, which indicate 
that the best managers can be selected and developed. For example in India there 
are separate Civil Services, like the Central Administrative Pool and the Industrial 
Management Pool of India as successor to the Commerce Finance Pool, where the 
selection is made and the most capable human resources are chosen to perform 
managerial functions (Basu, 2008). Selected candidates are worked with through 
internal training, but they are also sent to the best business schools in the world. 
They are expected to achieve certain specific strategic and financial objectives. If 
they are successful, they can expect rewards and bonuses. The result is that the 
SOEs sector in India, due to such approach to selection of managers, is more 
profitable that the private enterprises sector. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analyses indicate that the global crisis in many countries in the world has 
changed the practice when it comes to companies in which the state owns the 
assets (SOEs). While in the 1980s and 1990s the tendency prevailed to reduce 
state ownership of business entities (mainly through the privatization process), the 
early 21st century shows to a certain extent opposite trend, which is particularly 
evident after the outbreak and strengthening of the negative impact of the global 
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economic crisis . At the same time changes have been introduced in corporate 
governance of SOEs in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness in business, 
but also to achieve other, not only economic, but social goals as well.  
 
Experience shows that there is no single successful corporate governance practice 
that can be applied to all situations and legal systems. The pattern of successful 
corporate governance of SOEs varies from country to country. However, 
examples of good practice can serve as good guidelines for improving corporate 
governance. Starting from that, in our research comparative method of analysis 
was used where we focused primarily on understanding the specific challenges 
and problems of SOEs business in Slovenia and Serbia.  
 
There are huge and significant differences between the two countries in terms of 
macroeconomic parameters, the degree of economic development, structural 
characteristics of the economy and many other features. On the one hand, 
Slovenia is a member of the EU and EMU, and Serbia has yet to acquire the status 
of a candidate with a very uncertain date of commencement of accession 
negotiations. However, on the other hand, there are certain characteristics that 
connect the two countries and where the experience of Slovenia can be very 
instructive to improve corporate governance of SOEs in Serbia. 
 
It should be noted that in Serbia upgrading corporate governance is one of the key 
steps necessary for raising the levels of competitiveness of enterprises in which 
the state owns a certain amount of assets. These companies need to be able to 
provide better services, be efficient and be able to compete at international 
market. In that way they can help the country to meet the economic criteria for the 
integration into the EU. At the same time, raising standards of corporate 
governance can lead to more rapid structural changes of the Serbian economy and 
resolution of many accumulated problems.  
 
Analyzing individual areas, we found out that a lot has been done in some 
segments of corporate governance in Serbia. However, a number of outstanding 
issues and challenges show that SOE sector is still lagging behind, especially in 
terms of ownership policy, transparency and functioning and responsibilities of 
the boards of directors. 
 
Namely, in Serbia still there is no clear policy regarding the issue of ownership in 
SOEs. On the one hand, there are ideas to do privatization of many SOEs at 
national and local level in particular, and on the other hand there is a lack of the 
real willingness to do so. At the same time, insufficient results are achieved on 
increasing transparency and public disclosure of data, while management of SOEs 
is still heavily influenced by political factors. The example of Slovenia shows that 
establishment of a special agency enables clear definition of the ownership policy 
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in terms of the state ownership in economy. The issue of transparency still should 
be discussed and worked on, and professionalization of management is strongly 
required.  
 
The example of the Republic of Slovenia, as well as the cases of good practice in 
the Republic of Serbia, emphasize the importance of competent management. 
This confirms one of the starting hypothesis stated in this paper that the 
competent management is capable, regardless of the legal framework and the 
nature of ownership, to organize a successful business in SOEs. At the same time, 
the improvement of SOE operations largely depends on the way in which 
operational and strategic (investment) decisions are made, as a direct result of 
people selected for managerial positions. Yet at the same time, it should be taken 
into consideration that operational and strategic decision-making in SOEs does 
not depend exclusively on internal factors but is also influenced by external 
factors, primarily economic environment, and that the effectiveness of these 
decisions is largely determined by existing economic conditions. Therefore, the 
improvement of the current conditions for doing business in Serbia is one of the 
key assumptions of efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance.   
 
Having in mind that SOEs in Serbia represent, and they will represent for some 
time in future, a significant group of companies which have a large role in the 
overall economy, the improvement of the corporate governance in them can be 
estimated as being critical for raising the general level of competitiveness and 
fulfilment of economic criteria for the integration of certain countries into the 
European Union.  
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